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‘Violence’, in its everyday usage, shares meaning with a term - ‘violate’ - which is 
etymologically derived from it. ‘Violate’, as a verb, means variously   
“1) To break, infringe, or transgress unjustifiably   
2) To ravish or outrage (a woman).   
3)  To do violence to; to treat irreverently; to desecrate, dishonour, profane, or 
defile. 
4) To vitiate, corrupt, or spoil, esp. in respect of physical qualities.    
5) To treat (a person) roughly or with violence; to assail or abuse.   
6) To break in upon; to interrupt or disturb; to interfere with rudely or roughly” 
(O.E.D.1971: 3635)). 
Implicit in all the above senses of the term ‘violate’ is the concept of an integral 
space broken into and, through that breaking, desecrated. Thus, in its passive 
grammatical sense, ‘violate’ indicates something “characterized by impurity or 
defilement” as in, to use the Oxford English Dictionary’s own example, “Take home 
the lesson to thee...Who makest of this lovely land, God's garden, A nation violate, 
corrupt, accurst”2. The primary Oxford English Dictionary definition of the noun 
‘violence’ - “the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage 
to, persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this; treatment or usage 
tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom” (Ibid.) - 
relays with it this sense of an assault of one entity upon the integrity of another.   
Other definitions of ‘violence’, however, cohabit with what the Oxford English 
Dictionary categorizes as the primary one, specifically,  
“force or strength of physical action or natural agents; forcible, powerful, or violent 
action or motion (in early use freq. connoting destructive force or capacity). Now 
often merging into next, with an intensive sense....great force, severity, or 
vehemence; intensity of some condition or influence” (Ibid., definitions 3 and 4).  
Etymologically it is these ‘secondary’ meanings which have precedence. Skeat, in A 
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Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, derives ‘violent’ through 
the French from the Latin uiolentus, ‘full of might’, which is formed as an adjectival 
form from uiolus, ‘due to uīs (force)’ (Skeat1927: 594)3. The Oxford English 
Dictionary derives ‘violence’ from the Latin adjective violentia (vehemence, 
impetuosity, etc.), itself derived through the Latin violent-us from violens (forcible, 
impetuous, vehement, etc.) from vīs, strength (O.E.D.1971: 3635). The noun 
‘violence’ - which in its everyday connotation always presumes an object in relation 
to which it manifests itself - thus appears to be intransitive in its originary form, 
signifying a force or strength - a potential for action - preexisting and independent of 
whatever object it may or may not act upon in the future. The etymology, in other 
words, foregrounds what the Oxford English Dictionary suggests is no more than a 
peripheral meaning. Violence, at least semantically, does not need a victim.    
These philological burrowings may seem trivial in the wake of a collection of essays 
examining, from a number of revealing perspectives, not only the ways violence 
manifests itself in different cultural contexts but also the roles our perceptions of the 
violences of others have played in forging our European cultures and the disciplines 
we wield in our examinations of others’s cultures. The anthropologists who have 
contributed to this timely volume have brought a substantial conceptual armoury to 
bear on the question of whether or not ‘violence’ can be examined comparatively, 
and a retrospective investigation of the pre-history of the term they are mobilizing 
may seem regressive in light of the ground they have taken. My ‘retreat’ into 
European philology may seem even more pointless in light of David Riches’s 
assertion - articulated in an earlier foray into the anthropology of violence 
(Riches1986a) - that European terms do not always fit non-European contexts and 
describe the practices developed therein4. Although Riches continues to use the 
term ‘violence’ in his study, he attempts to ground his usage in nuanced empirical 
investigations of various contexts - European and non-European - in which violence 
can be seen, and he substitutes for the culturally limited “Anglo-Saxon meanings of 
violence” a definitional model he terms “superior”. Riches focusses his analysis “on 
the act of violence itself” (Riches1986b: 8) and thus redefines ‘violence’ as “an act of 
physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) 
witnesses”5 (Ibid.). In both Riches’s Anthropology of Violence and the volume you 
hold in your hands the term ‘violence’ is forced to do analytical and conceptual work 
beyond the bounds of its normal employment, and we as anthropologists can only 
benefit from the new perspectives on an old topic these books have offered. Why, 
then, do I insist on dragging out the etymological dictionaries?    
Riches’ insistence on defining violence as ‘an act of physical hurt’ and on 
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methodologically focussing on ‘the act of violence’ shifts the analytical emphasis of 
an anthropology of violence away from the source of violence (that which is capable 
of violence because it is ‘full of force’) and towards the socially-embedded 
performance of a specific type of violence (that which acts upon a recipient). 
Schröder and Schmidt, who at least nominally adopt Riches’s perspective6, are 
compelled by his definition to anchor their investigations on the observable 
performance of acts of violence against others who are subjected to that violence. 
While such a focus is indubitably appropriate to a discipline which bases its 
hypotheses on empiricist observation, the anthropology of violence’s tendency to 
restrict its attention to acts in the course of which one integral entity violates or 
attempts to violate another’s integrity prevents it from attending to other arenas in 
which violence operates, some of which I will argue are the fora in which the agents 
which threaten violence and are in turn threatened by violence are shaped. I will 
suggest in the following that violence is a force that not only manifests itself in the 
destruction of boundaries but as well in their creation, and that ‘intransitive violence’ 
(which may operate conceptually prior to manifesting itself in action) serves to create 
the integrities and identities which are in turn subjected to those forms of violence 
which seek victims. Violence - rather than being a performance in the course of 
which one integral entity (person, community, state) violates the integrity of another - 
may as well serve to generate integral identities by inscribing borders between 
something in the course of becoming an entity and its surroundings. Attention to 
etymology draws our attention to the context out of which a particular usage 
emerges at an historical moment, and in leading us to examine the process of 
differentiation that produces a particular meaning compels us as well to think of the 
meanings excluded and the reasons for those exclusions. In this case  
the etymology of ‘violence’ foregrounds aspects of the term’s semantic field which 
are not overtly manifest in the acts we define as violent. To see ‘hurting’ as an 





An examination of Pierre Clastre’s anthropology of pre-state societies is provocative, 
in spite of the criticisms which have been directed at its ‘primitivism’7, because 
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Clastre reveals the deep implication of violence towards other communities in the 
self-understanding of the Amerindian communities he worked with. In “The 
Archaeology of Violence” (Clastres1994 [orig. 1977]) #1201] and elsewhere Clastres 
conceives of ‘primitive society’8 as a face-to-face community inherently antagonistic 
to any moves towards dissolving its unity and effecting a “division...between those 
who command and those who obey” (Clastres1994 [orig. 1977]) #1201: 156]:   
“At its actual level of existence - the local group - primitive society...is at once a 
totality and a unity. A totality in that it is a complete, autonomous, whole ensemble, 
ceaselessly attentive to preserving its autonomy...A unity in that its homogeneous 
being continues to refuse social division, to exclude inequality, to forbid alienation. 
Primitive society is a single totality in that the principle of its unity is not exterior to it: 
it does not allow any configuration of One to detach itself from the social body in 
order to represent it, in order to embody it as unity” (Clastres1994 [orig. 1977]) 
#1201: 155]. 
At the core of the sociality informing ‘primitive society’ is thus not only an antipathy to 
any figure of power distinguishing himself or herself from the collectivity through 
impressing his or her individual will upon the rest but as well a consensus around the 
necessity to mobilise against any actions which would dissolve that face-to-face 
society into any larger collectivity:   
“Primitive communities maintain a certain distance between each other, both literally 
and figuratively: between each band or village there are their respective territories, 
allowing each group to keep its distance.... [T]he hypothesis of friendship of all with 
all contradicts each community’s profound, essential desire to maintain and deploy 
its being as single totality, that is, its irreducible difference in relation to all other 
groups, including neighbors, friends, and allies (Clastres1994 [orig. 1977]) #1201: 
157]. 
Clastres argues that primitive societies are inherently antagonistic to any 
extra-communal logics of generalised exchange (whether logics of friendship, kinship, 
or economic trade) because such logics call on the members of autonomous 
communities to identify with others beyond the bounds of that community and, 
through that identification, initiate a process of unifying “the multiplicity of partial We’s 
into a meta-We...[which would lead to] the elimination of the difference unique to 
each autonomous community” (Ibid.). Clastres’s ‘primitives’ see social concourse 
beyond the demographic limits of their immediate communities as antagonistic to the 
‘We’ in which they find their identities, and implicitly recognise in this antagonism not 
only a threat to the intimate sociality which grounds their identity but as well the 
possibility of the emergence of an autonomous power to rule over them. From this 
recognition follows a profound social proclivity to warfare against ‘the Other’:  
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“primitive society refuses: identifying with others, losing that which constitutes it as 
such, losing its very being and its difference, losing the ability to think of itself as an 
autonomous We....[T]here is, inherent in primitive society, a centrifugal logic of 
crumbling, of dispersion, of schism such that each community, to consider itself as 
such (as a single totality), needs the opposite figure of the foreigner or enemy, such 
that the possibility of violence is inscribed ahead of time in the primitive social being; 
war is a structure of primitive society and not the accidental failure of an 
unsuccessful exchange”  (Clastres1994 [orig. 1977]) #1201: 157 and 158, 
emphases mine]. 
Violence is not here an act which impinges upon a social context from a space 
outside of community (either that of deviance or of an Other) or through the workings 
of contingency, but is a fundamental aspect of that context. The social is structured 
and maintained by the inherent promise (often realised) of violence at its borders. 
  
Exchange between groups, which stands in the history of anthropology as the matrix 
out of which the social emerges9, is in Clastres’s analysis predicated upon violence 
rather than threatened by its subsequent emergence:   
“primitive society constantly develops a strategy destined to reduce the need for 
exchange as much as possible: this is not at all a society for exchange, but rather a 
society against exchange....[It is only] the state of war between groups [which] 
makes the search for alliance necessary, which [in turn] provokes the exchange of 
women”  (Clastres1994 [orig. 1977]) #1201: 161 and 163]. 
For Clastres such exchange - initially provoked by the need for (tenuous) alliances 
which the war-producing logic of difference brings about - will, if allowed to run its 
course, lead in time to the concentration of power in the hands of individuals or 
cliques who reorient violence so that it no longer serves to maintain the integrity and 
autonomy of the group but instead works violence against the community in 
furthering the transformation of the community into something other than what it had 
been. Such individuals or cliques come into being as a consequence of the necessity 
of coordinating the society’s increased complexity which itself devolves from the 
unification of previously distinct populations, from the institutionalisation of means of 
effecting exchanges between peoples who are not in daily face-to-face contact, from 
the articulation of new modes of communication and legitimation for binding 
communities which do not share the same histories or habituses, and from the 
mobilization of hostile activities against societies bordering on the new social regime. 
In this instance violence, which had previously served as a force guaranteeing the 
perpetuation of a community’s integrity through the warlike marking of a border 
between that in-group and others outside of it,  begins its transformation into a 
bifurcated force for refashioning the character of the in-group and protecting the 
integrity of that new society it constructs. This violence acts on and for the group in 
the name of the group from sites of power (those occupied by priests, chiefs and 
royal families) easily distinguished from the spaces on and against which power 
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works.    
This development culminates in the emergence of modern state formations wherein 
some agents of the state appropriate to themselves the power to perform violence 
against outsiders as well against ‘deviant’ forces within the society the state controls 
while others constrain and direct the non-deviant citizenry so that it serves to 
perpetuate and reproduce the order characteristic of the state10.  With the 
emergence of such formations the process of discursively reconfiguring the ‘violence’ 
of authority so that it no longer appears as violence as such is in large part 
completed; henceforth ‘constructive’ violence comes to be seen as pedagogy and 
conformity while repressive state violence appears as the legitimate expression of 
the ‘will of the people’ which is rendered necessary by the state’s responsibility to 
protect the citizenry it represents from the illegitimate violence of the peoples’s 
enemies (external enemies of the state, criminals, revolutionaries, mad persons, 
etc.)11. The ‘transgressive’ violence of the enemies of the state is seen to threaten 
the integrity of the state and its citizenry from places beyond the boundaries of the 
social even when, as is often the case, that violence emerges from within the 
population ruled over by the state (hence the discursive formulation of the locales of 
deviance, criminality, and insanity by legislative, academic and medical institutions). 
As the visible violence of the state is popularly accepted as defensive and as carried 
out by persons and institutions representing the will of the citizenry, the state is 
strengthened in its power when ‘called upon’ to manifest its violence against 
‘enemies of the state’. Often the threat of the ‘other’ (national enemies, spies, 
criminals, ethnic or religious minorities, the insane) will be amplified (if not invented) 
by organs of the state so that it can expand its power over those it claims to protect. 
  
Few anthropologists would argue that it is our job to overthrow the state, but most 
would nonetheless argue that it should not be our role to strengthen its power. 
Nonetheless, the focus on violence as a violative act - as “an act of physical hurt 
deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses” - 
emphasizes the deviance of violence (whether, as in classical sociology, of the 
criminal, or, as in the popular discourses analysed by Schmidt in this volume, the 
violence of the cultural other) and thereby masks what the violence of the state and 
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the violence of enemies of the state share in common12. While few would object to 
the assertion that there are substantial differences between state and anti-state 
violences demonstrable in their means, their motives and their ends, fewer still would 
recognize that the perpetrators of these violences share, despite those differences, 
an intention to reshape the worlds of the people those violences touch, whether 
directly or through processes of memorialisation. One of the several strengths of this 
volume is its focus on the performative aspects of violence and of narratives of 
violence, and that emphasis, like that of Eileen Scarry’s powerful study of torture 
(Scarry1985), stresses that violence is ‘world-making’. It is important that we focus 
on the fact that it is not simply violative violence (torture, rape, cannibalism, acts of 
war and the transgressive like) which makes and unmakes worlds in which humans 
act or fear to act. ‘Defensive’ and ‘constructive’ violences (RSAs and ISAs), which 
shape a world of rules, rights, and regimes and peoples that world with imagined 
communities of ‘us’ and ‘others’, are deeply invested in the work of playing images of 
integrity off against the threat of images of violation, and we must attend in our 
analyses of social formations and deformations to the ways violences - violative and 




Dean closes his review of Chronicle of the Guayaki Indians by accusing Clastres of 
“unabashed pristinism” and by stating that Clastres’s work is a latter-day 
manifestation of “anthropology’s intellectual legacy of primitivism, which needs to be 
checked before the discipline can continue to fulfil its mission as a critical voice in the 
shaping of contemporary local and global affairs” (Dean1999: 11). It is true that 
Clastres’s fascination with what appears to him to be the zero degree of state 
organisation gives his work a neo-Rousseauian flavour which is very much out of 
fashion in the current day14. I am forced, however, to move beyond Clastres’s 
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material not because, like Dean, I feel it is “romantic...[and] essentializ[ing]” but 
because Clastres, in showing the Guayaki to be a paradigmatic case of absolutely 
non-statist organisation, does not show identities being formed but presents them as 
simply - and perhaps primally - already in place. When Clastres writes that,   
“for a Guayaki tribe, relations with Others can only be hostile....There is only one 
language that can be spoken with them, and that is the language of violence. This 
stands in surprising contrast to the Atchei’s clear and consistent desire to eliminate 
all violence from relations among companions” (Clastres1998 [orig. 1972]) #1382: 
237] 
he presents us with a social condition which can only be opposed those of other 
societies already caught up in developing in the direction of ‘proto-statist’ and ‘statist’ 
formations. We can imagine (and today witness) the Guayaki being violated 
(rendered impure, defiled) by movements to reify political authority within and over 
their community, but we cannot conceive of how their idea of community came into 
being in the first place15. If violence against others is a structural principle of 
community, how could community exist before others were encountered? Yet, how 
could there be others to encounter if there wasn’t already a community existing in 
terms of which to think otherness? Clastres shows, synchronically as it were, that 
violence and identity are profoundly interwoven in Amerindian society. His opposition 
of primitive non-statist societies to proto-statist and state societies enables us to 
think a genealogy of violence within which two sorts of violence emerge within the 
space of the social - one normative and defensive, the other deviant and violative. 
What Clastres’s ethnography does not show is identity arising out of violence, and 
this - rather than simply the intermingling of violence and identity - must be 
demonstrated if violence is to be seen as a force that is creative as well as 
destructive.  
Simon Harrison, in The Mask of War: Violence, Ritual and the Self in Melanesia, 
contends that amongst the villages of the Manambu lineages in the middle Sepik 
region of Papua New Guinea “peaceful sociality within and between communities is 
[normally] taken for granted” (Harrison1993: 149). However, the intra-sociality 
(characterised by trade and gift exchanges between communities) which links 
persons across a wide and potentially unbounded social field is periodically 
shattered by rituals performed by the men’s cults of the region which discursively 
compel members of the communities within which those cults operate to perceive 
peaceful exchanges between communities as acts of aggression rather than 
cooperation. Manambu men’s cults ‘create’ a threatening ‘outside’ by dividing a 
terrain which was previously the ‘inside’ of sociality into two opposed sectors - that of 
‘us’ and that of ‘them’. In the Manambu region this division is effected by positively 
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valorizing certain types of social interaction (those pertaining to kin and ritual 
relations) and condemning others as collaborations with the enemy (trading relations 
with neighbours, hospitality towards guests, gift exchanges with members of 
adjacent communities). Because peaceful sociality within and between communities 
is normally taken for granted   
“the only way that bounded groups can form is through purposive action against that 
sociality. The sociality itself cannot be extinguished, only transformed into a sociality 
of a different kind. There is no choice whether to have social ties with other 
communities; they can only have such ties. The only possibilities are that these 
social ties may be peaceful or violent” (Ibid.: 149).  
In reinterpreting elements of intra-social interaction manifesting cooperation between 
communities as signs of violence committed against the in-group by its enemies the 
members of these cults - who are in effect ‘warriors in waiting’ - are able to dominate 
the communities through creating a shared perception of the necessity for mobilising 
for war. The men “transform a conception of themselves as simply a co-resident 
collectivity of kin and neighbours interacting in various ways with each other and with 
outsiders into a conception of a specifically political entity independent of others” 
(Ibid: 150). Identities are thus not only formed for the men, but new modalities of 
identity are generated for all the members of the community (as well as for those in 
the communities warred against). War thus produces particular crystallisations of 
sociality out of what had previously been larger networks of interaction. The men’s 
cults, by propagating violence, produce new realities:  
“The Melanesian men’s cults were not simply cultural responses to a violent world, 
but attempts, specifically by men, to prescribe such a world whether or not it actually 
existed at the level of behaviour. The cults were not simply functional adaptations to 
war but were male organisations for ‘producing’ war and for producing the bounded 
groups to wage it” (Ibid: 149).  
In some ways of course the situation described by Harrison in Melanesia could be 
seen as a transformation of (or development out of) that presented by Clastres for 
Paraguay; the Manambu of Avatip village may well be acting as would the Guayaki 
were the latter, lured by trade and exchange into peaceful relations with their 
neighbours, to have subsequently rebounded from that sociality and returned to their 
autonomous groupings. Certainly Harrison says of the Manambu that “[t]hey fought 
and fostered war in their cult, not because they lacked normative ties beyond the 
village but, quite the opposite, precisely because they had such ties and could only 
define themselves as a polity by acting collectively to overcome and transcend them” 
(Ibid: 150)16. Certainly it is the case that the boundaries inscribed by the activities of 
the Avatip men’s cults activate territorial divisions which pre-existed the initiation of 
antagonistic relations. While peacetime Manambu sociality draws together spatially 
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distinct communities by establishing trade and gift exchange relations between them 
there nonetheless remains a discrete ‘inside’ which engages the ‘outside’ on friendly 
terms; Harrison describes his generalised sociality as a “sociality between groups” 
(Ibid: 23). In a situation of inter- communal warfare these groups render themselves 
once more distinct by changing the sorts of ‘goods’ which pass through the territorial 
boundaries between them from goods which assert mutual dependency (trade 
objects, gifts, guests) to those which assert antagonism (bellicose rhetorics, raiders, 
cut off heads). In this systolic and diastolic movement between open and restrained 
sociality one finds resonances with the structural oscillation Leach described 
between gumsa and gumlao modes of social organisation among the Kachin people 
of Highland Burma (Leach1954).  
It is not, however, the structural constraints and limited social play of tribal 
communities which I want to evoke in my final example of the creative powers of 
violence. It seems, throughout the previously discussed examples, as though a 
dynamic force has mobilized the various social formations we have observed. In both 
the Guayaki and Manambu instances violence against others is consequent on 
perceptions by the war-making communities of a profound threat offered to their 
being by the presence of the others. The Guayaki are presented by Clastres as living 
with a perpetual awareness that sustained interactions with others will mortally 
wound the way of living that the members of the isolate community share, and this 
sense of the threat of sociality with the other leads, in the shorter rather than longer 
term, even to the violent termination of alliances with groups with whom they have 
banded together to war against others. Similarly the men of the Manambu mens’s 
cults are literally divided from the forces which maintain them and their communities 
during times of peace. In situations of war, on the contrary, they reunite with the 
spirits from whom they were separated in mythical times:   
“when men went on a raid all these beings were believed to go into battle with the 
men and fight invisibly alongside them....[I]t was not just the men who went to war 
but the very resources for which they fought - their entire ritual system, their rivers, 
lakes and their total means of livelihood - took up arms and went with them” 
(Harrison1993). 
Like Bertrans de Born in Ezra Pound’s “Sestina: Altaforte”, the men of the Avatip 
men’s cult Harrison worked with were only men when they were at war:   
“I have no life save when the swords clash....  
Then howl I my heart nigh mad with rejoicing....  
Hell grant soon we hear again the swords clash!  
Hell blot black for alway the thought ‘Peace’!     
(Pound1971 [orig. 1926]) #1386] 
  
In each of these cases it can be argued that the ‘threat’ perceived as devolving from 
the situations the people war to escape is ‘unreal’ or ‘illusory’, but in terms of that 
powerful collocation of tradition, mythology, rumour and shared practice which 
makes up a lived world these beliefs are as real as the worlds they people inhabit. 
They are, in other words, ‘to die (or kill) for’.    
The ‘threat’ which these people perceive as threatening to strike at the very core of 
their being is what I would, following Laclau and Mouffe, term an ‘antagonism’. A 
confrontation with an antagonism is not a competition since, in a competition, both 
the winner and the loser emerge from their struggle as the subjects who entered into 
it; the only difference is that one will have acquired an advantage or object for his or 
her self which the other will have failed to grasp. An antagonism is different since in 
the case of an antagonism the subject is himself or herself put at risk by the 
confrontation; “the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself” 
(Laclau & Mouffe1985: 125). In some instances - such as that cited by Laclau and 
Mouffe of a peasant who can no longer be a peasant because of the landlord who is 
evicting him from the land he works - the relationship is quite material. In others - 
and I think here of Brian Moeran’s study of violent popular films in Japan wherein the 
fictional gesture of extreme and transgressive violence is an inscription that enables 
both audience and author to fantasize overcoming the antagonism of a mortality that 
will erase them and their mundane acts (Moeran1986) - the perception of 
antagonism and the response to it may seem deeply subjective and even poetic. An 
antagonism is, furthermore, not something as easily evaluated as ‘a matter of life or 
death’; many persons would feel that to carry themselves badly in battle and to 
survive it marked (even if only by themselves) as cowardly would be far more 
antagonistic to their selves than to die well in battle. An antagonism is perceived as a 
threat to the subjectivity of the person threatened, and for that reason its perception 
will depend strongly not only on cultural determinants but as well, and to varying 
degrees, on particular life histories. What antagonisms hold in common is that they 
put the self at risk, and that they are perceived as needing to be overcome if the 
subject is to endure. The Guayaki instance - where the dissolution of the face-to-face 
community into wider social networks threatens the world which enables the 
members of the group to be who they are - like that of the Manambu men - where 
the persistence of peace is antagonistic to identities which can only be sustained in 
situations of war - demonstrate the way perceptions of antagonism work in relatively 
uncomplex societies to stabilize identities and to create and sustain social groupings.
  
I would like in closing briefly to refer to a contemporary situation which I have studied, 
both through fieldwork as well as through books and newspapers, over the past ten 
years. Unlike the previously discussed examples, this situation involves a 
modernized complex society with a long experience of statehood. I would like to 
examine the period leading up to the past decade of warfare in the late Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia,  which we now refer to as ‘Former Yugoslavia’. I 
  
do not intend to delve deeply into the history of the region or into ethnographic 
studies of it; the story of ‘the death of Yugoslavia’ is familiar to most readers, and I 
list below some of the ethnographic and historical work on the region which I have 
found useful (or have written)17. Yugoslavia’s peoples have been radically 
transformed over the past fifty years as varying experiences of antagonisms - 
individual and collective - have led to the constitution of numerous groupings and 
regroupings. There have been numerous advocates - with various agendas - 
testifying to the enduring and fixed identities of the people who make up 
Yugoslavia’s national groupings18, but the evidence suggests instead that identities 
have - in the course of encounters with circumstances interpreted as personal and/or 
as collective antagonisms - been reformulated and subsequently fixed into forms 
which differ radically from those which have preceded them. Here we do not see the 
oscillation that was implicit in Harrison’s work and, perhaps, latent but unobserved in 
the tribal societies examined by Clastres. We see instead radical disruptions of 
previous modes of life, the articulation of strategies of opposition to perceived 
antagonisms which, in the course of being worked through amidst the contingency of 
events, result in the recognition of new solidarities which create new subject 
positions to defend. Violence, here, engenders identity.   
Yugoslavia was a state born out of war, and the federation which emerged from the 
Second World War, under the leadership of Marshall Tito, was shaped by the 
region’s experience of the war. “During the Second World War the conquerors not 
only destroyed the state, but they set its components against each other in an 
unprecedented way, for never before had there been physical conflict among the 
Yugoslav peoples as such” (Pavlowitch1988: 14). Over one million of a pre-war 
population of seventeen million were killed, and Paul Garde estimates that eighty 
percent of the deaths were inflicted on Yugoslavs by Yugoslavs (Garde1992). As a 
consequence of Tito’s and the partisans’s recognition that the state was vulnerable 
to external attempts to subvert and destroy it, especially through mobilizing 
nationalist insurrection as the Germans and Italians had during the war, the state 
propagated a powerful ideology of bratstvo i jedinstvo (‘brotherhood and unity’) which 
promoted economic and political equality between the national elements making up 
the federation and which repressed, with all the necessary state violence, the 
emergence of any nationalist tendencies within the national groupings, tendencies 
which the government (and many of the people) saw as antagonistic to the survival 
of Yugoslavia. Through the development of a powerful state apparatus, focussed on 
the Yugoslav National Army, and the careful playing off through the following twenty 
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 See particularly (Pavlowitch1988),  (Allcock1992), (Feldman et al.1993), (Bowman1994), 
(Bringa1995), (Silber & Little1995), (Kirin & Povrzanovic1996) (Godina1998), 
(Bowmanforthcoming). 
18 
 The myth of the eternal enmity between the peoples of the Balkans has a long history 
(see (Glenny1999) for a critical assessment of its usage by the Great Powers) but fell out of 
use between the latter part of the Second World War when the British threw their support 
behind Tito and approximately 1993 when most of the NATO countries decided that 
Yugoslavia should be divided along ethnic lines.  
  
five years of its non-aligned status as a means of garnering economic support from 
both Soviet and capitalist states, Tito and the Communist Party were able to 
maintain authority, provide a decent standard of living for most of the population 
(supported by massive loans from the IMF and elsewhere as well as by strong 
dependence on the export of Yugoslav gasterbeiters to Western European nations), 
and suppress and occasionally violently crush any emergence of nationalist 
mobilization.   
In the 1980s, however, the whole carefully constructed edifice began to crumble. The 
Arab Oil Embargo of the seventies had seriously damaged the Western economies, 
and many of the loans which had so profligately been granted to Yugoslavia to lure it 
towards the capitalist road began to be called in.  Simultaneously Yugoslavia’s 
ability to export both its labour and its goods was impaired. By 1984 Tito was dead 
and the economy was in tatters with an unemployment level of  fifteen percent, 
inflation at sixty two percent, and a drop in the average standard of living of thirty 
percent from its 1980 level (Mencinger1991: 76-79). A general disgruntlement began 
to set in throughout the country as state policies began to be seen not to defend the 
people and their standard of living but to be attacking them; in the early eighties a 
wide range of assertions - expressed in idioms ranging the economic and political to 
those of art and culture (Mastnak1991) - began to articulate perceptions of the 
antagonism of the state to its people .  
These expressions did not, however, fall ‘naturally’ into a nationalist idiom. Tito's 
anti-nationalist policies and the modernization processes which had accompanied 
them had to a large extent submerged the idiom of national identity beneath a flood 
of contending discourses on selfhood. Rural migration to the cities and to areas 
‘outside’ Yugoslavia where money could be earned had eroded much of the 
pre-communist rural isolation. In the cities a trans-Yugoslav cosmopolitanism had 
developed around work, education and cross-marriage. The violence of the state 
was thus not initially perceived as inflicted upon one’s national being but appeared to 
attack people’s abilities to earn and save money, play or listen to rock music, call for 
greater representation in political forums, and so on. All Yugoslavians were afflicted 
by the declining standard of living and the clumsy moves of the state to enforce 
cultural and economic homogeneity during this period and within the republics the 
state’s antagonism to personal fulfillment struck at all residents, regardless of 
whether or not they were of the ethnic majority.   
The discursive shift to nationalist discourse occurred through the intervention of 
republican politicians who created ‘national’ platforms from whence they could 
launch bids to increase their holds on power in a Yugoslav state characterised, after 
the death of Tito, by a vacuum at the political centre. To gain power they had to 
consolidate their holds on the dispersed dissatisfactions which had grown 
exponentially after the breakdown of Titoist hegemony (Ramet1985), and many did 
so by inventing ethnically-defined constituencies to represent. The general strategy 
followed throughout the regions was to convince the people that the reason they 
  
could no longer live they way they believed they had a right to in Yugoslavia was 
because the communist state - aligned with other national groupings which benefited 
from depriving them of their rightful national heritage - was expressing towards them 
the antagonism with which it had treated other members of their national 
constituencies over the past forty five years. People whose individual encounters 
with a collapsing economy and an increasingly paranoically repressive state 
convinced them that the state had produced a situation which was antagonistic to 
them as individuals were faced, as regional elections mobilized the federation in the 
late eighties, with nationalist politicians (many of whom had been previous members 
of the communist bureaucracies) who told them that their sufferings as individuals 
who happened to be Slovenes, Serbs, Croats or whatever were in fact symptomatic 
of the sufferings that all of the respective national group’s population - dead or alive - 
had had inflicted upon it over the past decades by an antagonistic state and/or 
antagonistic neighbouring national groups. Nationalist campaign rhetorics were 
grounded not on calls for reforms and changes in the Yugoslav constitution but on 
platforms which argued that the state was dedicated to the destruction of the nation 
and, for that reason, had itself to be destroyed. I was, for instance, in Ljubljana 
during the campaigns for the Slovene election and was struck by the sight of 
anti-state campaign stations bedecked with pictures of caves (foibe) filled with the 
bones of persons killed during the massacres which had taken place at the close of 
the Second World War. Although the persons the partisans and others had killed 
came from various national groupings and political movements, the captions on the 
photographs said simply “This is what They did to Us”. The assertion was direct - 
‘the communists killed Slovenes en masse as they came to power’ - and the 
implication needed no further elaboration - ‘and subsequent policies from the 
communist state towards the Slovenes has been a continuation of national genocide 
by other means’. This rhetoric called on people as Slovenes to recognise that 
communist violence towards Slovenes in the past was qualitatively the same as the 
state's violence towards them in the present.  Individuals encountered antagonisms 
which threatened them with the impossibility of being what they had previously been 
as individuals, and were subsequently taught first of all that much worse was to 
come and secondly that they now were sharing the experience of the state’s 
antagonism with a nation of others. The explosion of nationalist rhetoric which 
accompanied the opening year of the war (which encompassed a massive 
production of revisionist, nationalist histories), along with prolific evidence of 
attempts by respective groups to wipe out others, provided people who responded to 
being addressed in national terms with evidence of the previously concealed 
violence which had afflicted ‘their people’s’ pasts as well as irrefutable proofs of the 
need to kill others in order that they, and the nation with which they were now 
conjoined, would endure.   
In Yugoslavia people whose experience of relative deprivation in relation to a more 
affluent and liberal past were easily convinced that violence had been performed 
against them by some agent who had ‘stolen their pleasure’. Clever political 
  
manipulation, and the possibility of presenting an earlier period’s ‘defensive violence’ 
(the repression of nationalism) as an example of a “nation theft” (Zizek1990) which 
was in fact a ‘theft of being’, enabled various political cliques to come to power on 
the back of a popular will to destroy the antagonism which they experienced. Out of 
that rage, and the will to destroy the other before it destroyed ‘us’, were forged 
strong collective identities which in time - and after extreme genocidal violence 
against previous neighbours - gave rise to a multitude of new nations. It is, I believe, 
important to acknowledge that these new nations, even when they took old names, 
were not resurgent identity formations brought back into being by the collapse of 
communism but new inventions of community - far less tolerant of alterity than had 
been previous ones - which had been imagined and then carved out of multi-ethnic 
communities in response to fantasies of the violence the others would carry out on 




I began this afterword by suggesting that violence was a force for creating integrities 
as well as one that simply violated, polluted and destroyed already existing entities. 
In the course of developing that idea I have shown that identity politics forms borders 
which enclose an ‘I’ or a ‘we’ and exclude - oftimes violently - others. Through 
examining Pierre Clastres’s material on Amerindians’s war-based wills to autonomy 
and then Simon Harrison’s men’s cults which crystallize identities by attacking 
sociality I came to suggest that communities, like individuals, draw borders not so 
much to assert presence but to exclude the influence of that which is perceived as 
threatening to the persistence of that presence. I then suggested that an entity’s 
perception of what Laclau and Mouffe call an ‘antagonism’ - a presence which is 
believed radically to threaten the persistence of that quiddity which marks the being 
of an entity - may precisely provide the spur that drives an entity to mark out the 
boundaries of its identity and to ‘defend’ them with violence - a violence often 
manifested aggressively (pre-emptively). It is important to stress that a perception of 
antagonism is sufficient to impel individuals and communities to boundary marking, 
maintenance and defense. Identity may be far more inchoate than is the sense of 
threat to its persistence that an antagonism provides. Attributions of antagonisms 
need not be groundable, and it is often the case that an enemy is sited and a 
programme of ‘defensive’ violence inaugurated without any ‘real’ justification. The 
instance of the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia was cited as a situation in which the 
state - and later ethnic groups seen as antagonistically allied with the state against 
the interests of  national communities - served as the foci around which nationalist 
politicians invented constituencies by mobilizing generalized dissatisfactions and 
both directing them towards and attributing them to the antagonism of the other. In 
designating an other against which destructive violence must be mobilized, an entity 
  
realizes - through the negation of that it would negate - what it is it fights to defend.  
         
Glenn Bowman         
University of Kent         
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